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What Explains the Growth in 
Commodity Derivatives?
Parantap Basu and William T. Gavin
This article documents the massive increase in trading in commodity derivatives over the past
decade—growth that far outstrips the growth in commodity production and the need for deriva-
tives to hedge risk by commercial producers and users of commodities. During the past decade,
many institutional portfolio managers added commodity derivatives as an asset class to their port-
folios. This addition was part of a larger shift in portfolio strategy away from traditional equity
investment and toward derivatives based on assets such as real estate and commodities. Institu -
tional investors’ use of commodity futures to hedge against stock market risk is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Trading in commodity derivatives also increased along with the rapid expansion of
trading in all derivative markets. This trading was directly related to the search for higher yields
in a low interest rate environment. The growth was both in organized exchanges and over-the-
counter (OTC) trading, but the gross market value of OTC trading was an order of magnitude greater.
This growth is important to note because a critical factor in the recent crisis was counterparty
failure in OTC trading of mortgage derivatives. (JEL G120, G130, G180)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2011, 93(1), pp. 37-48.
not been monitored. On July 21, 2010, President
Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law.
As of this writing, the regulatory rules have yet
to be finalized, but the proposed regulations are
intended to limit the use of derivatives by banks
and make OTC trading more transparent. 
The market failure that led to the recent finan-
cial crisis was centered in the opaque, bilateral
OTC trading by firms that policymakers at the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury considered too
big to fail. Because of the potential risks involved,
it is important to understand mechanisms that
large financial firms can use to exploit the govern-
ment’s safety net. In this article, we document
the massive increase in trading in commodity
derivatives over the past decade. This growth far
T he recent financial crisis was causedby large financial firms taking on toomuch risk (leverage) using complicatedinstruments in opaque trading environ-
ments.1 Commodity derivatives trading was one
such area. Commodity derivatives include futures
and options traded on organized exchanges as
well as the forwards and options traded over the
counter. Organized exchanges monitor trading
of standardized contracts and require margin
accounts that protect investors against counter-
party risk. The exchange is the counterparty in
all trades. Over-the-counter (OTC) trades are
bilateral exchanges of customized contracts.
Margins are not required and such trading has
1 See remarks by Gensler (2010).
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outstrips the growth in commodity production
and the need for derivatives to hedge risk by com-
mercial producers and users of commodities. 
During the past decade, many institutional
portfolio managers added commodity derivatives
as an asset class to their portfolios. This addition
resulted in substantial growth in the use of com-
modity derivatives—growth out of proportion
with the historical levels associated with commer-
cial hedging. This shift was part of a larger change
in portfolio strategy away from traditional equity
investment and toward derivatives based on
assets such as real estate and commodities. 
Trading in derivatives does not affect the
fundamentals of supply and demand in any obvi-
ous way. The derivative trades sum to zero—for
every winner there is a loser, for every gain there
is an equal loss. Financial firms can write an arbi-
trarily large number of contracts betting on a future
price without necessarily affecting the level of
that price. However, an arbitrarily large number
of contracts means that there can be an arbitrarily
large number of losers. The important policy ques-
tion is whether the taxpayer is at risk for counter-
party failure in OTC trading when some financial
firms incur large losses. If a large portion of these
investments is made by financial firms that would
likely fall under the protection of the government’s
safety net, then the firms that win will retain their
profits while those that lose may shift the burden
of their losses to the taxpayer. There is a public
interest in preventing large-scale betting by insti-
tutions protected by the government’s safety net.
It is not a zero-sum game for the taxpayer. 
In this article, we explore the reasons for the
explosive growth in trading in commodity deriv-
atives and advance two main reasons for that
growth. First, investors used commodity futures
to hedge against equity risk. Both academic and
industry economists argued that a negative corre-
lation between returns on equity and commodity
futures offered an unexploited hedging opportu-
nity in using commodity derivatives as an asset
class.
Second, trading in commodity derivatives
increased along with the rapid expansion of trad-
ing in all derivative markets. This trading was
directly related to the search for higher yields in
a low interest rate environment. The search for
higher yields refers to the tendency of both indi-
vidual and institutional investors to choose riskier
assets when the return on safe assets is low.2
Jiménez et al. (2008) used a large dataset from
the credit register in Spain to show that bank
borrowers are more likely to default if the loans
are made when central bank interest rates are
relatively low. They also showed that (i) the price
of risk tends to be low when short-term interest
rates are low and (ii) if the interest rate is low for
a long time, the economy’s “portfolio” of loans
tends to be riskier. 
Many derivative instruments that grew rapidly
after 2000, such as commodity futures index funds
and derivatives on mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) such as collateralized debt obligations,
were developed in the 1980s and 1990s. Dybvig
and Marshall (1997) described the newly devel-
oped risk-management processes that included
ever more-complex derivatives. Their description
noted the possibility of the good, the bad, and
the ugly outcomes of using such financial instru-
ments. The good is the new opportunity for more-
precise hedging and risk reduction.3 The bad is
the possibility that CEOs and portfolio managers
may not fully understand the ramifications of
using these complex new instruments. The ugly
is the possibility that firms could use OTC deriv-
atives to intentionally take risks that could not be
observed by regulators or other market partici-
pants. All three outcomes have been evident over
the past decade, but it is the ugly outcome that
is most responsible for the worldwide financial
crisis. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second
section documents some facts about growth in
commodity futures and provides indirect evidence
that the rise in derivatives trading was associated
with institutional investors using commodity
derivatives as an asset class. The third section
advances arguments why a negative correlation
Basu and Gavin
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2 See, for example, Rajan (2005), Ferguson et al. (2007), and Gerlach
et al. (2009).
3 See Banerji and Basu (2009) for an example showing how banks
could use new and creative contracts to offer new risk-bearing
services that would be expected to reduce the risk premium in
equity markets.
between stock and futures returns may not nec-
essarily offer a hedging opportunity to investors.
The concluding section discusses the reform
legislation and prospects for continued trading
in commodity derivatives. 
TRADING IN COMMODITY
DERIVATIVES: THE FACTS
The large increase in trading in commodity
derivatives was not due to a large increase in hedg-
ing by commercial users. It is important to dis-
tinguish between the commercial hedgers who
produce and use commodities and the institu-
tional investors who use commodity futures to
hedge equity and bond risk. For example, com-
modity futures index funds were marketed to
institutional investors as an asset class. Figure 1A
depicts the growth of these funds using year-end
data for 1994 to 2008. Contracts for these funds
are an investment in a long position in a value-
weighted portfolio of commodity futures. In 2002,
there were fewer than $20 billion in these index-
fund contracts. At year-end 2008 these funds had
grown to more than $250 billion, about one-fourth
to one-third of the notional amounts of commod-
ity futures traded on organized exchanges. In 2007
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) began collecting information on the
amount of funds invested in these index funds.
Figure 1B reports the CFTC data through
September 2010. Note that the exchange trading
of commodity futures has rebounded and has
nearly recovered to the peak achieved in June of
2008.
Trading in OTC commodity derivatives mar-
kets also grew rapidly during the period, as shown
by the gross market value of commodity deriva-
tives (Figure 2A). Gross market value is a measure
of the funds that investors have at risk on both
sides of the bet; for example, it includes funds at
risk on both the long and short sides of a forward
contract. Figure 2A also depicts the gross market
value of equity derivatives contracts. The gross
market value of commodity derivatives rose by a
factor of 25 between June 2003 and June 2008—
reaching $2.13 trillion in June 2008. Figure 2B
shows the gross market values of commodity
derivatives (excluding precious metals) and gold
derivatives.4 Traditionally, institutional investors
have used gold as a hedge against inflation and
other risks. There was no surge in the volume 
of gold derivatives as there was for other 
commodities.
Figure 3 shows prices for the Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) Goldman Sachs Commodity Index
(GSCI), gold, and two ABX indexes that are for
derivatives on insurance contracts for MBS.5
From the day the S&P GSCI peaked, July 3, 2008,
to the day Lehman Brothers filed bankruptcy,
September 15, 2008, the S&P GSCI price index
fell 37 percent (Figure 3).6 Investors with a short
position made large profits, but investors with a
long position lost hundreds of billions of dollars.
These were investments traded over the counter,
so it is difficult to know what part, if any, these
losses played in the financial panic that accom-
panied Lehman’s default.
Oil was about 40 percent of the weight in the
S&P GSCI and drove the broad pattern in the S&P
GSCI. The commodity price index (see Figure 3)
rose very sharply with the trading volume of the
commodity derivatives market (see Figures 2A
and 2B) and peaked in July 2008 when oil prices
peaked. It then fell sharply through the second
half of 2008. The gold price was much less volatile
(see Figure 3), with no unusual rise in the trading
volume of gold derivatives (see Figure 2B). Note
that the gold price and the commodity price
index rose together until mid-March 2008 (see
Figure 3), when the Federal Reserve rescued the
counterparties to Bear Stearns. The commodity
price index (see Figure 3) and trading volume of
commodity derivatives then grew very rapidly
while the trading volume of gold derivatives was
flat to down a bit (see Figure 2B). The commodity
price index started falling 10 weeks before finan-
cial markets panicked with the Lehman bank-
Basu and Gavin
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4 Non-gold precious metals were a small percentage relative to gold
and are ignored here. 
5 The gold price is a monthly average of the London PM fix; the
source for all prices is Haver Analytics.
6 We assume that the S&P GSCI represents the market price for the
underlying asset in the OTC commodity contracts.
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Figure 1A
Commodity Index-Fund Investment (year-end)
NOTE: 2008 data are through March only.
SOURCE: Masters (2008, Chart 1).
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Figure 1B
Notional Long Positions Invested in Commodity Futures Index Funds
SOURCE: CFTC.
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OTC Trading in Commodity and Equity Derivatives (gross market value)
SOURCE: Bank for International Settlements derivatives statistics. 
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OTC Trading in Commodity Derivatives (gross market value)
SOURCE: Bank for International Settlements derivatives statistics. 
ruptcy filing. The fourth quarter of 2008 was very
bad for the economy and financial markets. After
year-end, the prices of gold and other commodities
as measured by the S&P GSCI began an upward
trend that continued through to December 2010.
It is possible that the unusual spike in prices
and trading volume for commodity futures was
influenced by the loss of confidence in MBS and
associated derivatives. Figure 3 shows the loss of
confidence in both the highest-rated (AAA) and
lowest-rated (BBB–) mortgage derivatives. The
ABX BBB– index—for derivatives on mortgage
insurance for subprime MBS—began to decline
in December 2006 and had fallen 60 percent by
August 2007 when the possibility of a wider finan-
cial crisis became apparent. By that time, confi-
dence in the highest-rated mortgage paper was also
falling. The prices and trading volume of com-
modity derivatives rose sharply as confidence in
the market for subprime mortgages collapsed.
The sharp spike in the price of commodity
futures in July 2008 and subsequent collapse by
the end of that year is hard to explain. The S&P
GSCI was driven mainly by oil prices. Although
the longer-term rise in oil prices is often attrib-
uted to rising demand associated with growth
Basu and Gavin
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in emerging market economies, a secular rise in
demand cannot explain the 2008 boom and
bust.7
Figure 4 shows the outstanding notional
amounts of commodity derivatives contracts
(their face value): The amount tripled between
June 1998 and June 2003 and then rose 19-fold
in the next 5 years, peaking at $13 trillion in June
2008. During this period, trading in commodity
derivatives grew to exceed trading in equity deriv-
atives. Note that, in contrast to trading on organ-
ized exchanges, OTC trading in commodity
derivatives has continued to decline since the
summer of 2008. 
To provide some perspective on the size of
derivative positions, consider that world GDP
rose from $30 trillion in 1998 to $61.1 trillion in
2008.8 Commodity prices almost quadrupled
over the decade before their peak in July 2008.
Even at 2008 prices, the total output of com-
modities was less than half the notional value of
outstanding commodity derivatives contracts
(nearly $13 trillion).9 The ratio of the notional
amount of commodity derivatives contracts in
June 1998 to world GDP rose from 1.5 percent
in 1998 to 21.6 percent in 2008. Over the same
period, the ratio of equity derivatives to world
GDP rose from 4.2 percent to 16.7. At first glance,
this shift appears to be consistent with the rising
use of commodity derivatives as an asset class in
institutional portfolios.
TWO EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
RISE IN COMMODITY 
DERIVATIVES TRADING
One explanation for the rise in commodity
derivatives trading is that it was simply part of a
widespread increase in risky investing during
the past decade that was attributed to a “search
for yield.” A second explanation for the rise is
Basu and Gavin
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7 See, for example, Kilian (2009).
8 We are using World Bank estimates of world gross domestic product
(GDP) in U.S. dollars.
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
June 1998 June 2000 June 2002 June 2004 June 2006 June 2008 June 2010
$ Billions
Equity Contracts
Commodity Contracts
Figure 4
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SOURCE: Bank for International Settlements derivatives statistics.
9 Even at its peak price in July 2008, total world production of oil
in 2008 was less than $4.5 trillion. Oil constitutes the largest share
of total commodity production. For example, the estimated world-
wide production of corn, wheat, and soybeans in 2009 was less
than $100 billion. See, for example, www.nue.okstate.edu/Crop_
Information/World_Wheat_Production.htm.
that it was driven by a mistaken notion that an
investment in commodity futures can be used to
hedge equity risk. An early paper by Greer (2000)
and later papers by Erb and Harvey (2006) and
Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) found a negative
correlation between returns to a passive long
investment in commodity futures and returns to
equity.
The Search for Yield Hypothesis
The term “search for yield” is somewhat
vague. In an efficient market model, all investors
are assumed to optimize over combinations of
risk and return. One should not choose more risk
unless the expected returns also rise. One way to
interpret the search for yield is to argue that, at
low interest rates, investors are willing to take on
relatively more risk for only small increases in
return. In such a case, investors will bid up the
price of risky assets and, all else equal (including
default probabilities), the price of risk will decline.
This search for yield may explain why risk pre-
miums were so low in 2003 and 2004 and offers
one reason (among many) for the high leverage in
household mortgages and financial institutions.
During the period of rapid growth in com-
modity derivatives, managers of pension funds,
university endowment funds, and other institu-
tional funds began to include commodity deriva-
tives as an asset class in their portfolios. There
was a shift out of domestic equities into commodi-
ties.10 One argument was that investing in such
real assets could increase returns without adding
much risk. This leads us to the second hypothesis:
Brokers and dealers selling commodity deriva-
tives also argued that commodity futures could
be used to hedge equity risk.
Hedging Hypothesis 
Fully collateralized commodity futures histori-
cally have offered the same return and Sharpe
ratio as U.S. equities. Although the risk pre-
mium on commodity futures is essentially the
same as that on equities for the study period,
commodity futures returns are negatively cor-
related with equity returns and bond returns.
The negative correlation is the result, primarily,
of commodity futures’ different behavior over
a business cycle (Gorton and Rouwenhorst,
2006, p. 47).
While the use of commodities to hedge infla-
tion risk was widely appreciated, their use to
hedge equity or business cycle risk is more con-
troversial. Using data from July 1959 to December
2004, Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) calculated
the return to holding a rolling long investment in
a value-weighted portfolio of commodity futures.
They reported that the correlation was nearly
zero for short horizons and negative, but not sta-
tistically significant, for horizons up to one year.
This is consistent with research at the CFTC by
Büyüks¸ahin, Haigh, and Robe (2008), who found
that the unconditional correlation between equity
and commodity futures returns is near zero. But
their results changed as the investment horizon
lengthened. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) also
reported that if this investment was rolled-over
for a longer period, the return was negatively
correlated with the returns from comparable bond
and equity portfolios. They found that the aver-
age correlation between returns on equities and
commodity futures was a statistically significant
–0.42 if the investments were held for 5 years. 
Figure 5 reports a rolling 5-year correlation
between returns on an index of S&P 500 equities
and the index of commodities included in the
S&P GSCI. When commodity prices peak in June
2008, the correlation is negative on average. How -
ever, following the collapse of commodity prices
in the summer of 2008 and the subsequent finan-
cial panic in September 2008, the correlation
becomes highly positive, reaching a record 0.56
in February 2010. Thus, portfolios that included
commodity derivatives to hedge equity risk did
very badly over the last 2 two years studied. In
the years building up to the crisis and since,
portfolios that included commodity derivatives
were more volatile than equities-only portfolios.
The high returns in 2004 through 2006 reflected
very risky investments—not only those in mort-
gage derivatives. Note that this is the first busi-
ness cycle following the widespread adoption of
this new investment strategy.
10 See Cohn and Symonds (2004), Symonds (2004), and Palmeri
(2006).
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Rolling Correlation Coefficient Between Daily Equity and Commodity Returns (5-year window
with 5-year returns)
NOTE: The equity index is the S&P 500. The commodity index is the S&P GCSI. The returns are calculated as the percent change in
the total return.
SOURCE: Haver Analytics and authors’ calculations.
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Rolling Correlation Coefficient Between Daily Equity and Commodity Returns (1-year window)
NOTE: The equity index is the Wilshire 5000. The commodity index is the S&P GCSI. The oil price is the domestic spot price on West
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SOURCE: Haver Analytics and authors’ calculations. 
Similar changes are seen in the correlation of
daily returns. Figure 6 reports a rolling correla-
tion coefficient between total returns to invest-
ments in the Wilshire 5000 and the S&P GSCI
using a 1-year window. The correlation is rela-
tively small and generally not significantly differ-
ent from zero until the onset of the financial crisis.
During and following the crisis, the correlation
is very large and positive. Because the S&P GSCI
is heavily weighted in oil, we also show the daily
correlation between the Wilshire 5000 and the
daily spot price of West Texas Intermediate crude
oil. This correlation makes it clear that the S&P
GSCI is heavily influenced by the oil market.11
Erb and Harvey (2006) argued that the most
important source of expected return from a port-
folio of commodity futures comes from diversifi-
cation across individual commodities that have
uncorrelated returns. They described the differ-
ent schemes used to construct weights to aggre-
gate the component commodities and explained
why the excess returns depend on there being
little correlation among returns for the individ-
ual component commodities. They also warned
against assuming that historical return correla-
tions will persist. Tang and Xiong (2010) showed
that the introduction of index trading led to a rise
in the correlation among the individual commodi-
ties included in an index, thus reducing or even
eliminating the gains to diversification within
individual index funds. They further showed
that the rise in the correlations among the indi-
vidual components began in 2004, well before
the onset of the crisis, and became higher over
the next few years as open interest in commodity
index futures rose. 
Figures 5 and 6 show that the correlation
between returns to equity and commodity futures
can change sign over time. In a general equilib-
rium model in which there are no unexploited
hedging opportunities, it is straightforward to
show that the equilibrium correlation can be
either negative or positive, depending on the
nature of shocks to the world economy.12 In par-
ticular, the correlations shown in Figures 5 and
6 depend on investors’ perceptions about how
the domestic economy and commodity produc-
tion will respond to various shocks. 
CONCLUSION
We offer two possible explanations for the
surge in trading commodity derivatives. The first
also explains the massive increase in trading of
risky mortgage debt and all financial derivatives:
Investors were searching for more substantial
yields in an environment with very low returns
paid on safe assets. This also explains why
investors moved from real estate derivatives to
commodity derivatives when the problems in
the subprime market became apparent.
The second reason is a prevailing notion
among institutional investors that commodity
derivatives are an asset class that can be used to
hedge equity risk, a notion we argue is mistaken.
Even if the observed correlation between equity
and commodity futures returns were reliably
negative, it is likely that this negative correlation
would be an equilibrium arbitrage phenomenon
that should be expected in a world where no
unexploited hedging profit opportunity exists.
The rise in commodity derivative trading thus
poses a challenge to asset-pricing theorists to
explain in a well-articulated rational asset pric-
ing model. 
The lesson from this financial crisis is not
that the government should prevent firms and
investment funds from investing in commodity
futures. As we noted, it was the unregulated,
opaque OTC trading that was a critical factor in
the financial crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act is
intended to limit this type of trading and to make
it more transparent. This outcome is already sug-
gested by the incoming data. On organized
exchanges (where traders are monitored and
protected against counterparty failure), trading
of commodity derivatives has nearly recovered
Basu and Gavin
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11 Table 3 in Erb and Harvey (2006) reports the portfolio weights for
three commodity futures indexes as of May 2004. Crude oil is about
40 percent of the S&P GSCI and all energy commodities make up
two-thirds of the weight in the index. This does not include grains
used for ethanol. They also report that 86 percent of the open
interest in commodity futures indexes was in the S&P GSCI. 12 See, for example, Basu and Gavin (2010). 
to the peak achieved in June of 2008, while OTC
trading in commodity derivatives has continued
to decline. 
A lesson from the crisis is that regulators and
policymakers should monitor financial innova-
tions closely to learn whether they are being used
to take excessive risks—that is, risks firms would
not take if they were operating outside the gov-
ernment’s safety net. Under new regulations, the
CFTC will collect information that should make
trading in commodity derivatives more transpar-
ent. Banks argue that they need to use commodity
derivatives to help customers manage risks. This
may be true, but the recent experience in com-
modity futures did not reduce risks but exacer-
bated them just at the wrong time. The challenge
to the government is to prevent too-big-to-fail firms
from using current and yet invented derivatives
to increase overall risk in the financial system. 
Basu and Gavin
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